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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2
(2001).
ISSUE TO BE REVIEWED
Did the trial court act within its discretion in dismissing Appellant Phillip Coxey's
lawsuit for failure to disclose a videotape he intended to use as an exhibit during the
second trial in this matter, "[g]iven the potential irreversible prejudice to defendant, the
fact that plaintiff was allowed a second chance at his case through the granting of a new
trial, the timing of the revelation of the videotape, the lack of good reason or excuse for
not producing the videotape and the inequity of allowing plaintiff the equitable remedy of
a new trial when they stood before the court with unclean hands . . . ?" (R. 866).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL
The issue set forth above was preserved at R. 923-26 and 1071. However, the
issue Mr. Coxey proposes for appeal was not preserved for this Court's review. Mr.
Coxey asks this Court to consider whether dismissal was appropriate under the 1999
version of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37 "when there was no violation of a court order
[and] where Rule 37(f) does not apply to the case . . . . " (Appellant's Brief, p. 1). In
arguing against dismissal of his case for failure to disclose the crucial videotape,
Mr. Coxey never suggested to the trial court that the 1999 version of Rule 37 applied, nor
did he suggest the rule was not applicable in the absence of a court order. (R. 923-26;
1071, pp. 240-95).
1

Appellate courts will not consider issues or arguments raised for the first time on
appeal. Timm v. Dewsnup, 86 P 3 d 699 (Utah 2003); Coombs v. Juice Works
Development, Inc., 81 P.3d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). As explained below, even if he
had presented these arguments before the trial court, there were still ample grounds for
the court to exercise its discretion to dismiss his case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. Coxey acknowledges that this issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1). As the court in Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) noted,
[management of the actions pending before it is uniquely the business of the trial
court and while an appellate court may, of course, intervene if discretion is abused,
we accord trial courts considerable latitude in this regard and considerable
deference to their determinations regarding discovery.
Schoney, 790 P.2d at 585.
DETERMINATIVE RULES ON APPEAL
Three rules are determinative on appeal, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37(f),
41(b) and 60(b)(6). These rules are attached as Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
1.

The Parties Presented This Case to a Jury, Resulting in a No-Cause
Verdict for the Eagles.

This case arises from a May 30, 1997 incident in which Appellant Mr. Coxey
claims he was electrocuted at a campground owned and operated by Appellee Fraternal
Order of Eagles ("Eagles"). (R. 1-3). The parties participated in a four-day jury trial in
2

June 2002, during which Mr. Coxey was permitted to present his entire case to the jury.
(R. 213). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Eagles, finding that the Eagles was
not negligent as alleged by Mr. Coxey. (R. 232-33). The trial court entered judgment on
the jury verdict. (R. 232-33).
2.

The Trial Court Granted Mr. Coxey a New Trial Because Mr. Coxey
Claimed Unfair Surprise at the Testimony of an Expert.

Unhappy with the jury's rejection of his case, Mr. Coxey moved the trial court for
a new trial on several bases. He contended that he was entitled to a new trial because a
juror allegedly fell asleep during proceedings, then he accused the Eagles' paralegal of
talking to jurors during the trial.1 (R. 277-78). He also complained that the Eagles
unfairly surprised him by calling a supposedly unanticipated expert witness to testify on
the issue of proximate cause. (R. 273-76). The trial court granted Mr. Coxey a new trial
on the basis that the Eagles should have supplemented its discovery responses to give
more information about the expert witness. (R. 398-99). Even though the Eagles had
twice disclosed the expert witness before trial, the trial court was persuaded that the
failure to fully disclose the expert's opinion via supplementation of discovery responses
created confusion for Mr. Coxey. (R. 397-99). The trial court did not conclude that the
Eagles acted with willfulness or fault, instead stating that "there had been a breakdown in
communication that may have resulted in possible prejudice to plaintiff." (R. 859).

*Mr. Coxey only raised these matters after the verdict came in against him.
3

The trial court ordered a new trial solely on the ground that there had been a failure
to disclose information in discovery. (R. 674). The court noted that the second trial was
granted "to correct a fairly narrowly defined error" - - to allow Mr. Coxey to depose the
expert witness and "otherwise retry the case as the first case had been tried." (R. 1070, p.
239; 859). Indeed, the court ruled at the pretrial conference the week before the second
trial that no new evidence could be introduced at the second trial beyond evidence
pertaining to the Eagles' expert witness. (R. 1069, pp. 1-17).
3.

At the Second Trial, Mr. Coxey Attempted to Use Photographs from a
Videotape He Failed to Disclose During Discovery.

Before the second trial, Mr. Coxey retained a new attorney. (R. 859). The second
trial, now nearly seven years after the incident, began on February 23, 2004. (R. 666).
On the first day of the second trial, Mr. Coxey's new attorney stated that he intended to
offer photographs of the campground that had never been disclosed to the Eagles in
discovery. (R. 859). The Eagles had sent discovery requests to Mr. Coxey in early 1999
asking for "[a]ll photographs available to, or in the possession of, the Coxeys, showing
the campground, or any aspect of the electrical system of the campground as well as any
photographs showing the trailer or any of the cord involved in the incident." (R. 679-80).
The Eagles also asked Mr. Coxey in discovery requests to provide "[a]ny and all
photographs available to or in the possession of the Coxeys showing marks left on
Mr. Coxey's person after the incident." (R. 679).

4

The photographs Mr. Coxey sought to introduce at the second trial were not ones
he had disclosed in discovery, but were still photographs taken from a videotape of the
campground made on May 31, 1997, the day after the alleged electrocution. (R. 1071,
250-51). Mr. Coxey never disclosed the existence of the videotape to the Eagles during
discovery. (R. 670-71).
4.

Mr. Coxey's Failure to Disclose the Videotape Prejudiced the Eagles in
Several Ways,

The videotape depicted several critical pieces of evidence.2 (R. 859). First, Mr.
Coxey was in the video, not in any apparent physical or mental distress the day after the
incident, despite claiming that he has sustained a disabling head injury as a result of the
electrical shock. (R. 673). Had Mr. Coxey disclosed the videotape before trial, the
Eagles would have had an opportunity to play it for their medical experts and have them
testify at trial to his physical and mental status hours after an alleged electrocution. (R.
673).
Second, the videotape purported to document Mr. Coxey's physical injuries from
the electrocution and contained much clearer images of Mr. Coxey's left arm than the
photographs he had provided during discovery. (R. 671). These images were important
to the Eagles, since the Eagles contested that the marks on Mr. Coxey's arm were
produced by electrical energy. (R. 671-72). The videotape showed minor scrapes on Mr.

2

It bears noting that Mrs. Coxey testified in her deposition that on the night of the
incident Mr. Coxey retained the counsel who represented him at the first trial. The very
next day, the Coxeys made the videotape.
5

Coxey's arm, and had Mr. Coxey properly disclosed the videotape during discovery, the
Eagles could have played the videotape for flie emergency loom nurse who treated
Mr. Coxey after the alleged incident, to have her confirm that the scrapes shown on the
videotape were the scrapes she recalled seeing at the emergency room.3 (R. 673).
Additionally, Mr. Coxey's attorney told the jury during opening statements that
Mr. Coxey received a welt on his head from the electrocution. (R. 1070, p. 142; 1071, p.
243). However, the videotape did not show his head, which was curious given the fact
that the videotape was taken in part to document his injuries. (R. 1071, p. 243-44). The
Eagles would have had an opportunity to explore this curiosity had the videotape been
properly disclosed. (R. 1071, p. 244).
Third, the videotape showed Mr. Coxey's trailer and the trailer next to it at the
campground. (R. 672). The adjacent trailer was plugged into the same electrical outlet
on which Mr. Coxey claims he was electrocuted. (R. 672, 859). The license plate of the
other trailer is visible in the videotape. (R. 672, 859). The Eagles had been unable to
locate any witnesses from the campground, but it could have used the license plate of the
adjacent trailer to track down the owner, interview him and test his trailer to see if it
might have been the source of the grounding problem. (R. 672, 859-60). The owner of

3

Sometime before the second trial, the emergency room nurse moved out of state,
and one of the Eagles' caretakers at the campground died. (R. 860). Thus, two witnesses
who could provide potentially helpful testimony to the Eagles regarding the videotape
were unavailable by February of 2004, when Mr. Coxey disclosed it at the second trial.
6

that trailer likely would have been able to testify about the condition of the electrical
system and the absence of any problem with the outlet. (R. 672).
Finally, Mrs. Coxey was narrating the videotape. Had the videotape been made
available when the Eagles deposed her and her husband, the Eagles could have questioned
them about it. (R. 673). As it was, the Eagles questioned the Coxeys during their
depositions about the existence of any photographs showing the campsite, and neither
revealed that they had taken a videotape of the campsite the day after the incident. (R.
860).
5.

The Trial Court Granted the Eagles' Motion to Dismiss the Case Based
on Willful Failure to Disclose Crucial Evidence.

After opening statements and testimony from one witness, the court called a recess
to allow the parties to research the issue of how to handle Mr. Coxey's nondisclosure of
the videotape and to give his new counsel an opportunity to contact his first counsel to
find out why it had never been disclosed. (R. 860). The court held a hearing on the
motion later that day. (R. 1071).
At the hearing, the Eagles moved for dismissal of the case on several alternative
grounds. First, the Eagles requested relief from the order granting a new trial based on
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which effectively would reinstate the original jury
verdict in the Eagles' favor. (R. 1071, p. 268). This rule permits a trial court, "in the
furtherance of justice" to grant relief from an order for " a n y . . . reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment."

7

Alternatively, the Eagles asked for a dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b), which allows involuntary dismissal for a plaintiffs failure to comply with the
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1071, pp. 268-69). As a third potential basis for relief, the
Eagles asked for dismissal as a discovery sanction under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37.
(R. 1071, p. 244). Rule 37(f) states that
[i]f a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by
Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1)... that party shall not be permitted to use the witness,
document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless
or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu
of this sanction, the court may order any other sanction, including . . . any order
permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C))
Subpart (b)(2)(C) provides for the sanction of "dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof. . . . ."
The Eagles' counsel noted that the relief sought would not "deny Mr. Coxey a
right to a trial. What we're doing is pulling back the privilege of a second trial, and
pulling it back from someone that's demonstrated he wasn't deserving of that privilege."
(R. 1071, p. 276).
Mr. Coxey's second attorney proferred at the hearing that he had been able to
speak with Mr. Coxey's first lawyer about the videotape. (R. 860; 1071, pp. 278-79).
Mr. Coxey's first counsel "had received the videotape from his clients early in the case
but decided that it was not admissible and simply shelved it." (R. 860; 1071, pp. 278-79).
Neither the first counsel nor Mr. Coxey was present at the hearing to answer questions by
the court or testify as to their explanation of events. (R. 861).

8

After argument by counsel, the court granted the motion for dismissal under Rules
37,41 and 60(b)(6). (R. 1071, pp. 292-93). Explaining its decision, the court noted the
irony that Mr. Coxey's first counsel had demanded a new trial "crying unfairness and
surprise so vigorously .. . and now we find out that he sat on this [videotape] for five, six
years, we're seven years into this and now it suddenly surfaces . . . . " (R. 1071,pp. 25152). The failure to disclose the videotape was "at a minimum the result of willful
conduct on the part of plaintiff s first counsel...." (R. 861; 1071, pp. 287-88).
The trial court conceded that its decision to grant a second trial had been a
"borderline decision," while Mr. Coxey5 s failure to disclose the videotape was an
"egregious, extreme violation of the rules." (R. 1071, p. 285; 864). Had it known after
the first trial that Mr. Coxey had withheld the videotape, it likely would not have granted
his request for a second trial. (R. 862). The trial court summarized its decision by
stating:
To now stand before the court accused of withholding material evidence in the
case for nearly seven years through a second trial when they availed themselves of
the equity and mercy of the court in asking for a new trial based on far less
egregious violations of the discovery rules is unconscionable
They simply
stand with unclean hands before the court after having been given an opportunity
for a second trial that they may not have deserved to begin with.
(R. 866).

9

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DISMISSING MR. COXEY'S CLAIM.
Mr. Coxey is asking this Court for a third trial in this case. The parties tried the
case fully to a jury in 2002, and the jury returned a verdict in the Eagles' favor.
Mr. Coxey convinced the trial court to give him a second chance with a jury by
complaining that the Eagles had not formally designated a witness. When the court
learned during the second trial that Mr. Coxey was guilty of a far more serious discovery
violation himself, it acted within its discretion by dismissing his case. The justice system
has given Mr. Coxey his full and fair day in court, and the trial court's decision should be
affirmed.
A.

The Trial Court had Broad Discretion to Deal with Discovery
Violations.

Trial courts have long enjoyed wide latitude in deciding whether to impose
sanctions upon parties for discovery violations, and in choosing what those sanctions
should be. This Court explained the need for trial courts to determine "the most fair and
efficient manner to conduct court business" in Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938
P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997). Since trial judges deal first hand with the parties and the
discovery process, they have superior understanding of the parties' motives, attitudes and
credibility and are in the best position to decide how a discovery violation should be
treated. Morton, 938 P.2d at 274-75.
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To impose a discovery sanction, the trial court must first find willfulness, bad faith
or fault on the fault of the noncomplying party. Id. at 274. "To find that a party's
behavior has been willful, there need only be 'any intentional failure as distinguished
from involuntary noncompliance.'" Id. at 276, quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court in this case found that there was
a willful failure to disclose a crucial piece of evidence because Mr. Coxey's first counsel
knew about the videotape, yet failed to identify it during discovery. The representation by
Mr. Coxey's second counsel that his first counsel determined the videotape was not useful
is irrelevant. The Eagles asked for any photographs during discovery. They asked for
photographs in written discovery and in depositions. Mr. Coxey did not produce the
videotape even though he, his wife and his first counsel were fully aware of it. The
deliberate nature of the nondisclosure is magnified here, because when Mr. Coxey's first
counsel demanded a new trial due to the Eagles' alleged discovery violation, he knew of
the videotape and knew he had not given it to the Eagles.
Once the trial court finds a willful violation, "[t]he choice of an appropriate
discovery sanction is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge." First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n. v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). An appellate court will
only overturn a trial judge's choice of sanction if there is "an erroneous conclusion of law
or . . . no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling." Morton, 938 P.2d at 274-75,
quoting Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996). The court did not make any

11

errors of law, relying on its equitable power as the manager of the trial and the Rules of
Civil Procedure to choose flie sanction that best fit the circumstances.
The trial court also had ample evidentiary basis for a dismissal. The trial court
justified its choice of dismissal as a sanction on the following grounds: (1) the videotape
contained highly relevant information that the Eagles could have used to bolster its
defense, and the Eagles were therefore prejudiced by not learning of the videotape until
the second trial; (2) Mr. Coxey was only in the position of presenting his case to the jury a
second time due to a "borderline decision" of the trial court; (3) Mr. Coxey did not reveal
the existence of the videotape until the first day of the second trial4; (4) Mr. Coxey had no
good excuse for not producing the videotape to the Eagles; and (5) the second trial was
not meant to be an opportunity for Mr. Coxey to bring in evidence that was not admitted
during the first trial, beyond evidence pertaining to the Eagles' expert witness. (R. 866,
1071,pp.247-48).5

4

Mr. Coxey's first counsel knew of the videotape shortly after it was taken. Mr.
Coxey's second counsel represented that he found out about the videotape a week before
the second trial. (R. 1071, pp. 244-45).
5

The trial court stated that "I never would have granted a new trial had I
anticipated that there was going to be this kind of approach taken . .. where there were
efforts to bring in new evidence . . . . I didn't see this as an opportunity to correct those
[strategic mistakes by Mr. Coxey's first counsel] by granting a new t r i a l . . . . "
(R. 1071, pp. 247-48).
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The trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding that Mr. Coxey should
be sanctioned for his willful discovery violation, and in choosing dismissal as that
sanction. This court should uphold its decision.
B.

Rule 37 was an Appropriate Legal Basis for Dismissal,

Mr. Coxey's main contention on appeal is that the trial court incorrectly relied on
the 1999 version of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, which was enacted the year after he
filed his lawsuit. He never raised this argument before the trial court, depriving the trial
court of the opportunity to consider what effect, if any, that argument should have on its
ruling. It is well-settled that appellate courts will not consider issues or arguments on
appeal that have not been raised before the trial court.
However, even if he had made this argument below, it would not have affected the
outcome. Mr. Coxey violated both the prior version of Rule 37 and the 1999 version.
The text of Rule 37 that Mr. Coxey attached as Addendum A to his appellate brief is
ostensibly the version he claims should apply to his case. That version (and the version in
place at trial) provides that if a party fails to answer interrogatories, the trial court may
take certain actions against that party. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) (1987).6 One
of the actions the trial court can take is to "dismiss[] the action or proceeding or any part
thereof...." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) (1987). Contrary to Mr.
Coxey's assertion on appeal, violation of a court order is not a prerequisite to imposing

6

An evasive or incomplete answer is considered a failure to answer. Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(a)(3) (1987).
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sanctions under the version of Rule 37 he contends is applicable. See Hales v. Oldroyd,
999 P.2d 588,592 (Utah Ct App. 2000) (Rule 37(d) does not require violation of a court
order, nor does it require a complete failure to comply with discovery); Preston &
Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (dismissal of a
counterclaim was authorized under Rule 37(d) in the absence of a specific order
compelling discovery).
Mr. Coxey also violated the version of Rule 37 that was in effect when the
majority of discovery occurred in this case and that is in effect now. Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(f) (1999) states that a party who does not disclose requested information
cannot use that information at trial unless the failure to disclose is harmless and the party
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(f) (1999).
In addition, the court may impose the sanction of dismissal. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
37(b)(2)(C) (1999). The trial court determined that the failure to disclose the videotape
prejudiced the Eagles in the defense of the case, and that Mr. Coxey had no good reason
for withholding the videotape. (R. 864-66). Under either version of Rule 37, the trial
court exercised appropriate discretion in dismissing Mr. Coxey5s case.
C.

Alternatively. Rule 4Kb) or Rule 60(b)(6) Provides Grounds for
Dismissal,

Mr. Coxey gives the false impression that the trial court dismissed his case by
relying solely on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The trial court actually had three
alternative legal bases for its decision to grant the Eagles' motion to dismiss. (R. 1071, p.
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293). The trial court primarily cited Rule 37 in its written Decision and Order of
Dismissal with Prejudice, but it also noted during the hearing that it had discretion to
dismiss the case under either Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) or 60(b)(6). Either of
these rules provides an alternative sound basis for dismissal of the case.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) pertains to dismissal of cases and allows
involuntary dismissal of a plaintiffs lawsuit for failure to abide by the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 60(b)(6) permits a trial court to grant relief from an order when the
circumstances justify it. Here, the Eagles requested relief from the court's 2003 Order for
New Trial. (R. 402-03). Either alternative ground would have met the purpose of
sanctioning Mr. Coxey for willful disclosure of a key document.
D.

Dismissal Was Not Too Harsh a Sanction for Mr, Coxey's Misbehavior,

Hoping to reverse the sound and thorough decision of the trial judge with semantic
quibbling, Mr. Coxey argues that even if the court acted within its discretion in
sanctioning him for his misconduct, dismissing his case was too extreme given "the
possibility for distinguishing between a photograph and a videotape." (Brief of
Appellant, p. 5). He claims that the Eagles' discovery requests for photographs of the
campground were not requests for videotapes of the campground, so his first counsel was
entirely justified in keeping the videotape of the campground under his hat.

15

Mr. Coxey's second counsel dissolved any alleged technical distinction between
"photograph" and "videotape"7 by taking still images from flie videotape and proposing to
introduce them in evidence as photographs. The trial court also disposed of this
argument by observing that a photograph is an image and a videotape is a series of
images; "to distinguish a videotape from a photograph is just I think hyper technical and
is not in keeping with the intent of the Rules of Civil Procedure where full disclosure is
supposed to be taking place." (R. 1071, pp. 287-88).
Mr. Coxey willfully withheld a videotape containing vital information that would
be helpful to the Eagles, then expected to show photographs from this videotape at his
second trial in support of his case. The only reason he had a second trial was that he
convinced the court a jury's verdict should be vacated because of miscommunication over
a defense expert. Dismissal was not too harsh a remedy for this conduct.
Utah appellate courts have respected trial courts' decisions to dismiss cases for
discovery misconduct. In Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the
Court of Appeals upheld a default against a party in a divorce proceeding for failure to
disclose assets in discovery. The court in Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App.
7

Mr. Coxey cited one 1988 Texas appellate court case where the court found that a
request for production of photographs did not include a request for a videotape.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7). However, as Mr. Coxey acknowledges, the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure in effect when the case was decided treated photographs and videotapes as
"two separate items of types of documents." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7). The Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure make no such distinction. Additionally, the court in the later case of
Crawford v. Deets, 828 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. App. 1992), ruled that a discovery request
by appellees for production of all "photographs" obligated the appellants to include
videotapes in their production.
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1992), affirmed the dismissal of a medical malpractice case on the ground that the
plaintiff identified new witnesses shortly before trial. See also Schoney v. Memorial
Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (factors within court's discretion to
dismiss case included untimeliness of plaintiffs' discovery responses, which prejudiced
plaintiff; age of case; and narrow escape from summary judgment earlier in the case);
W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977)
(affirming case dismissal due to plaintiffs persistent failure to respond in timely manner
to discovery requests); Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410 (Utah 1964)
(defendant's refusal to produce requested records supporting defendant's claim warranted
default judgment).
Mr. Coxey has not offered any compelling argument that would justify disturbing
the trial court's discretionary decision to dismiss his case. This Court should affirm the
dismissal.
SHOULD THIS COURT GRANT
A THIRD TRIAL, THAT TRIAL MUST BE LIMITED
TO THE EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES PERMITTED
AT THE SECOND TRIAL.
Demonstrating that he would attempt to misuse the extraordinary privilege of a
third trial, Mr. Coxey claims that if this Court reverses the trial court, the third trial should
be an unmitigated free-for-all, where new witnesses and evidence could be presented.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9). The trial court correctly limited the scope of the second trial
to the evidence in the first trial, plus evidence Mr. Coxey needed to put on to cross-
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examine or rebut the Eagles' expert witness. A new trial is not meant to give the parties
an opportunity to remedy past mistakes or deficiencies in their cases. If this Court
reversed and remanded with instructions that the third trial would be open to new
evidence, the Eagles would be forced to engage in another lengthy and expensive round
of discovery; it would also be tempted to designate its own additional witnesses, resulting
in a never-ending circle of discovery that would serve no benefit to the parties or the
court. Should this Court determine the trial court abused its broad discretion in
dismissing Mr. Coxey's case, it should not permit the third trial to become a circus.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Coxey has had his day in court, and he gained a second day in court through
behavior approaching subterfuge. This Court should refuse his request for a third day in
court because, as the trial court aptly put it, "'enough is enough' and . . . it is time to
simply terminate this case by dismissal." (R. 866).
DATED this

ay of September, 2004.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

(Ijfhn R. Lund
^-<fulianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Appellee Fraternal Order of the
Eagles
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Rule 37
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(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any
protective order authonzed under Rule 26(c) and shall, after
opportunity for heanng, require the moving party or the
attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to the
party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable
expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney
fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part,
the court may enter any protective order authorized under
Rule 26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion
the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons m a just manner
(b) Failure to comply with order
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery;
(b)(1)
Sanctions by court in district where deposition is
sanctions.
taken If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery A party, upon after being directed to do so by the court in the district m
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be
thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as considered a contempt of that court
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending If a
follows
(a)(1) Appropriate court An application for an order to a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a
party may be made to the court in which the action is pending, person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on
or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
district where the deposition is being taken An application for discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of
an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered
court in the district where the deposition is being taken
under Rule 16(b), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and
(a)(2) Motion
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by among others the following
Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel disclosure and
(b)(2XA) an order that the matters regarding which the
for appropriate sanctions The motion must mclude a certifi- order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to
cation that the movant has in good faith conferred or at- be established for the purposes of the action in accordance
tempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in with the claim of the party obtaining the order,
an effort to secure the disclosure without court action
(b)(2XB) an order refusmg to allow the disobedient party to
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question pro- support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibitpounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or ing him from introducing designated matters in evidence,
other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or
(b)(2)(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof,
31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissunder Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for ing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendenng
inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that a judgment by default against the disobedient party,
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit
(b)(2)(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to
an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or
compelling inspection in accordance with the request The mental examination,
motion must include a certification that the movant has in
(b)(2)(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or under Rule 35(a), such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A),
party failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to
information or material without court action When taking a comply is unable to produce such person for examination
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto,
may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or
an order
the attorney or both of them to pay the reasonable expenses,
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court
For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other
disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to circumstances make an award of expenses unjust
disclose, answer, or respond
(c) Expenses on failure to admit If a party fails to admit the
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as
(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the
requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or or the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party
or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof,
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining including reasonable attorney fees The court shall make the
the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionthe motion was filed without the movant's first making a good able pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of
faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit
action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the
objection was substantially justified or that other circum- matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
stances make an award of expenses unjust
admit
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(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or se\
answers to interrogatories or respond to request for inspectu
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a pai
or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to test
on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who
to take the deposition, after being served with a proper noti
or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories subm
ted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatorit
or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspecti
submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the requei
the court in which the action is pending on motion may mal
such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and amoi
others it may take any action authorized under Paragrapl
(A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of ai
order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the par
failing to act or the party's attorney or both to pay tl
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by tl
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substaj
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award <
expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not l
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectioi
able unless the party failing to act has applied for a protectiv
order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plat
If a party or attorney fails to participate in good faith in th
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required b,
Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing
require such party or attorney to pay to any other party th
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by th<
failure.
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness
document or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules
26(eXD, or to amend a prior response to discovery as requirec
by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause
for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this
sanction, the court may order any other sanction, including
payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees, any order
permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the
jury of the failure to disclose.

ule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(aXD By plaintiff Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of
ile 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be
smissed by the plaintiflf without order of court by filing a
•tice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
Lrty of an answer or other response to the complaint permitd under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
9missalf the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
tice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
erits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
mrt of the United States or of any state an action based on or
eluding the same claim.
taH2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a
>tice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of
is rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of the
a*ntilTon order of the court based either on:
(a)«2Ki) a stipulation of all of the parties who have apared in the action; or
(a)« 2)( ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
oper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
ior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to
;miss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defennt's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
• independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise
ecified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is
thout prejudice.
b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the
rintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
ler of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action
*d by the court without a jury, has completed the presentan of his evidence the defendant, without waiving hisrightto
;r evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may
ve for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
' the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier
he facts may then determine them and render judgment
inst the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment
ii the close of ail the evidence. If the court renders
gment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall
ce findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in
3rder for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this
•, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
roper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates
n adjudication upon the merits.
) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
n. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any
iterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary
lissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of
division (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
ding is served or, if there is none, before the introduction
idence at the trial or hearing.
i Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who
once dismissed an action in any court commences an
n based upon or including the same claim against the
1
defendant, the court may make such order for the
lent of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until
laintiff has complied with the order.
Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party.
Id a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (aXIXi)
, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party,
)nd or undertaking filed in support of such provisional
ly must thereupon be delivered by the court to the
?e party against whom such provisional remedy was
ed.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistaken. Clerical mistakes in judgments, order* at ither parti of the record and errors therein arising
Irom oversight or omission may be corrected by the *ourt at
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and
after such notice, if any, aa the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as
are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion bhall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.

